


The Greek World under
Ottoman and Western Domination:
15th-19th Centuries



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CHAPTER IV The Perception and Use of Religious Otherness in the Ottoman Empire: Zimmi-Rums and Muslim Turks

Evangelia Balta

My choice of subject is prompted by various events in recent years that have brought about what I call the nostalgic approach of historiography to the problem of the Ottoman legacy. I have observed the reconsideration of the term “Turkish yoke” by various academic circles, along with an attempt to enhance the Ottoman Empire as a paradise of religious tolerance and harmonious coexistence. During this period, the collapse of the Socialist regimes in Eastern Europe has provoked all-too-familiar conflicts and bloodshed between ethnic groups of different religions in the Balkan states, and this has resulted in violent realignments on the map, based in most cases on religion. Abrupt sociopolitical changes swept along with them the old collective memory and formed a new image of the past, which, at the level of historiography, presents diverse approaches—from echoes of the positivist school of the nineteenth century to the deliberations of post-modernism.

I have also been prompted by the diverse reactions to Turkey’s efforts to join the European Union, which has made Islam a source of fear in Europe, fear that has been reinforced by the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001. In the discourse that developed, Turkey, the only recognized successor to the Ottoman Empire, represented a “constant danger” for the whole of Christian civilization, and the European Union was labeled a Christian lobby. The fall of Constantinople and the later Ottoman sieges of Vienna in 1529 and 1683 became symbolic historic events that played important roles in shaping a collective memory and identity among European states. Once again, the deep-rooted conviction that the Turks were newcomers to the Balkans was intensified, and the duration of their presence there was overlooked.

In the end, the subject that emerged was the religious otherness of the Ottoman conqueror and the Balkan conquered, because it allows us to see very clearly how complicated the processes of memory always are and how complex is the social function of old and new memory formed through new internal conflicts and external balances. My intention is to present my subject briefly and schematically, avoiding simplification as far as possible, and to follow the perception and use of religious otherness throughout the Ottoman period. For this reason, in each case I link the data to a period and do not speak about them per se. I am interested in showing how in each instance and to what degree the religious otherness of the subjects of the Ottoman Empire is intertwined in political ideology and practice, because, as Elli Skopetea has noted,¹ it is usually the proportions that are confused in the overall historiographic ground plans of southeast Europe. The bibliography cited is merely indicative of the subjects broached in the text because, as we well know, there is an ocean of literature on these issues.

With the Ottoman conquest, a long process that ended symbolically with the fall of Constantinople in 1453, a society of conquerors imposed itself on the peoples of the former Byzantine Empire, henceforth the society of the conquered.² Anywhere in the world, the military conquest of one people by another is the primal source of social differentiation. In the Balkans, the geographical region on which my paper focuses, the new political and social reality that resulted was defined decisively by the religious otherness of conqueror and conquered, upon which the Ottoman Empire was constructed and functioned as a state entity. First, the *zimmi*, the conquered “infidel” peoples, Christians and Jews, were obliged under Islamic law (*shariat*) to pay a head tax to the sultan in order to guarantee their lives and property. Payment of the poll tax was the necessary convention in order for them to keep their religion and to continue living in accordance with their code of justice.³ Furthermore, the empire’s economic structure—that is, whatever concerned production and especially the manner of appropriation of surplus—and social institutions were articulated around issues of power and submission, which affected the religious identity of its subjects.

The peculiarities of the Ottoman political and economic system that shaped the terms of conquest and of subsequent sovereignty did not remain unchanged over time. Naturally, they underwent differentiations in connection with many factors in the historical *longue durée*, from the fall of Constantinople

to Tanzimat. Through the changes that took place, the religious otherness of conqueror and conquered acquired another dynamic. The issue is extremely complex and presupposes that we know the “strange history of the millet system”⁴ and have followed, furthermore, the course of the Rum millet’s identity over a period of four centuries during which the modern Greek nation was formed.

In the early centuries, all Orthodox Christian subjects of the sultan belonged to the Rum millet, headed by the Ecumenical Patriarch, a microcosm of ethnicities similar to that of the Ottoman Empire. It included not only Greeks but also all the Orthodox peoples of the Balkans—Orthodox Arabs and Caucasians. The term “Rum millet” gradually acquired a new meaning, as the rise of nationalism in the Balkans impelled the various ethnic and cultural communities toward a distinct national presence. Indicative of the importance of this new factor is that it brought about realignments of the ecclesiastical entities.⁵ I have chosen two distant moments in time in order to describe, in the light of their specific economic and social relations, the characteristics and the role of the religious otherness of conquerors and conquered and to point out the changes observed in this dynamic.

As is well known, the Ottoman state comprised two groups or estates, which were strictly distinguished from each other, as in every feudal society: the tax-exempt *askeri* (military and administrative ruling class), who represented the ruler’s authority; and the tax-paying subjects, the *re’aya*. To the first, protagonists in the conquest and expansion of the empire, the sultan ceded the protection and the administration of its territories, for which they appropriated part of the revenue. In this way, the state, through its representatives, drew upon the surplus of production, simultaneously perpetuating the mechanism of conquest.⁶ A main concern of the state was to ensure that each individual remained in his own class. The proper order of the world is predicated upon everyone’s knowing his place and function and remaining in it, exhibiting no further ambition or aspiration for social mobility.⁷ The *re’aya* (literally, “flocks” or “herds”), which made up the bulk of the empire’s population, were divided into two groups: Muslims and those belonging to the millets, which were distributed in agricultural and pastoral communities. A special group, small but very significant, was that of merchants and craftsmen, who were gathered in the urban centers.

We shall focus on the tax-paying *re’aya*, since it is the estate in which the conquered were classified on the basis of the theological and political concepts of the Ottoman state. The social and economic status of the *zimmi*, the infidel subjects, in contradistinction to the Muslim *re’aya*, demonstrates the reasons why, in the various Balkan national historiographies—to which the Greek is no exception—the term *re’aya* has been identified with non-Muslim subjects; its application was principally limited to Christian subjects of the empire.⁸ So the Muslim *re’aya* were transferred to the so-called dominant society, equated in the end with the tax-exempt *askeri* of the same religion, which illuminates the issue of the use, from about the mid-nineteenth century, of the term “Turkish yoke.” Through this process, every Muslim in the late Ottoman Empire came to be identified with the Turks, just as every Rum was considered Greek. This was the period in which the millets were considered minorities, precisely because the Turkish nation was dominant.⁹ As Keyder points out,¹⁰ the choice was consistent with the silent underlying scheme that the empire was a despotic state in which the Turkish yoke had been imposed by force on other, mainly Christian, peoples.

A good example that reveals how religious identity functioned as a specifying difference, socially and economically dividing the class of *re’aya*, comes from the arena of the empire’s fiscal policy in the early centuries of its rule, when the sultan defined the manner of taxing the resources of a region after its conquest. I have purposely chosen this aspect because it is the one par excellence in which we can trace how the political inequalities brought in the wake the conquest were maintained and perpetuated by the economic and social framework of the administration. I leave aside the head tax, which was levied exclusively on non-Muslim subjects and was the cause of individual and mass conversions to Islam.¹¹ It is also a commonplace that economic difficulties and insecurity contributed to the reduction of the Christian population immediately after the conquest.¹² So I confine myself to taxes imposed on both groups in the *re’aya* class.

The relevant legislation indicates that the fiscal system favored the Muslim peasant. The *gayri muslim*, the infidels, were obliged to pay one-fifth of their yields of agricultural produce, whereas the Muslims paid one-tenth or one-eighth, even though the mode and means of production were the same. The situation was no different in another important economic sector at the time—trade. Muslim merchants paid 3 percent

customs duty on the goods they were trafficking, while Christians and Jews paid 4 percent and foreigners 5 percent.¹³ I could cite numerous other examples; my intention here, however, is not to give an analytical report but to show that over the years the political inequality between the empire's subjects, which occurred as a result of conquest and was accompanied by imbalanced taxation, further reinforced the identity of said subjects. In such geographical regions as the Balkans, where Christians far outnumbered Muslims, it was only natural that the fiscal obligations were perceived as a term of conquest. The empire's fiscal policy imprinted precisely the political inequalities brought by the conquest, since the religious otherness between the sovereign and the subject community operated overtly in favor of the former. I hasten to preempt possible objections by underlining that the levying of the tax is not, of course, a consequence of the conquest. However, the terms of levying the tax are linked inextricably with the ruling role of the conquering society. As a result, the Ottoman Empire was considered and continues to be considered in Balkan historiographies as a state with two social formations aligned in a relationship of submission and domination, with the Muslim being the dominant and the non-Muslim being the subject, in our case the Rum millet.

It has been maintained recently, however, that there was no such distinction in the Ottoman Balkans. There was no ruling—or at least no socially dominant—group of conquerors that was surrounded by special privileges and distinguished in an institutional and symbolic manner from the conquered.¹⁴ This view, which had been expressed earlier in a less simplistic manner but always bypassing the essence and stopping short of full exploration, was founded in the basic argument that the Muslim community was not as a whole hegemonic and consequently did not generally participate in the appropriation of goods and the wealth they generated. It has never been maintained and could not be maintained in a historiographic discussion that the society of the conquerors was economically dominant or as a whole hegemonic. On the other hand, I consider that the absence of a hereditary aristocracy in correlation with the important role of “the sultan's slaves” in the administration, as well as the fact that there generally was no right to land ownership, do not necessarily support the view that all *re'aya*, Muslim and non-Muslim, were equal in the eyes of the state. Such arguments are rightly characterized as legitimizing myths of certain Ottoman studies.¹⁵ It would be extremely interesting to study the political and ideological coordinates of these legitimizing myths, in which, each time with a different pretext, the Ottoman conquest and its consequences are ignored or underrated.

In recent years the model of multiculturalism and, therefore, of the cultivation of a multinational image, which was readily espoused at the level of political rhetoric and diplomacy, has replaced the model of the “homogeneous” national state. It was adopted with equal rapidity by the social and historical disciplines in Balkan countries, which, in their effort to replace the long tradition of nationalist historiography, have formed a new genre of historiographic discourse inculcated by post-modern approaches, mainly of synchronic character and more anthropological than historical. I would remind you, however, that *Fatih* (conqueror) was the epithet of Sultan Mehmed II.

The Ottoman political system is expressed through a conquering society and not a conquering class—hence the emphasis placed on elements that unify the various groups making up Ottoman society. “The conquering society of the Ottomans encompassed multiple groups, all accepted as *different*. Difference was not horizontally eradicated but vertically integrated into the political system. . . . The particular—the difference—was the given; it was, indeed, normative,” as A. Rodrigue stresses.¹⁶ The complete incorporation of the conquered subject into the system of authority, so that he could benefit from all opportunities for social advancement, was predicated on the transition from one cultural identity, such as religion, to another. In other words, it presupposed Islamization. And those *zimmi* who reached high echelons in the military and administrative hierarchy did so only through the mechanism of the child levy (*devshirme*). On the other hand, the presence of Christian *sipahis* in the early years of the empire does not disprove the rule. This is a phenomenon of a transitional period and is linked with a particular policy followed by the first sultans, especially Mehmed II, who did not take away the *pronoia* of certain Byzantine nobles but allowed them to be kept in the form of timars. It is not fortuitous that this practice had no continuity as a method of conquest, just as it is not fortuitous that this class of Christian *sipahis* was short-lived. Indeed, we know that some of them very soon converted to Islam.

The Rum millet had cohesive ties, as expressed by the institutions of the church and of the communities, traditional organizations with their own hierarchy and justice that were maintained and shaped by the central

authority as ancillary mechanisms of administration and control. They functioned positively, through their institutional role, in the ethnic, religious, social, and economic survival of the millet. The administrative roles of the *zimmi* did not go beyond the limit circumscribed by their religious identity. They were confined to community aggregations, the body of the church, and certain auxiliary military corps, the *armatoloi*. From the seventeenth century, only one social group held high administrative offices, always under restrictions. These were the Fanariots, some families of which offered their services to the Sublime Porte continuing into the nineteenth century. From the Rum millet, only the Fanariots and the patriarch were close to the seat of power and connected with it. In the strictly delimited roles between the two communities of conquerors and conquered, mercantile and financial activities, such as tax farming, were channels of communication. The conquered subjects' activity in these sectors became increasingly important over the centuries. These were, however, roles that, even when not conceded by the sovereign, were always dependent on him for continuity and in no case entailed vertical mobility.¹⁷

Within this framework, the nature and the role of religious otherness as it developed in the late eighteenth century, after a series of political and economic changes that became statistically significant only in the seventeenth century, will be demonstrated. The central government often lost control over the surplus, which resulted in the progressive disappearance of the *timar* holders. Revenue extraction gradually fell under the control of tax farmers, who were often officials. Provincial governors, *ayans* and *derebeys*, took advantage of the lax administration to usurp state lands and to reduce the sultan's peasants to misery. The Ottoman Empire's external trade was progressively and increasingly being determined by the consumer needs of Western Europe. Tax farming had always been present, of course, but now it dominated the methods by which the state appropriated the surplus.¹⁸ This situation led to the rupture of the "circle of justice" (*adalet dairesi*) guiding subject and sovereign, according to which the first—that is, the taxpayer—produced and the second, who levied the taxes, protected him.

Thus, it is no coincidence that a change in the meaning of the term "millet" can be observed in the late eighteenth century. During the early centuries of the conquest and throughout the so-called classical period, the millet system was the strategy that helped the Ottoman state to organize and categorize those under its rule and to function as a legitimate source of authority over them. Moreover, its maintenance aimed at reproducing one of the basic social distinctions of the Muslim Ottoman state, the distinction between Muslims and non-Muslims. From the late eighteenth century, the term "millet" denotes an autonomous protected community of non-Muslim Ottoman subjects. So, the change in the conceptual content of the term reflects the change in the dynamic of religious otherness of conqueror and conquered. It is directly dependent first on the Rums' participation in the economic activity of the European merchants and second on Russia's interventionist policy on behalf of the fellow Orthodox Christian Ottoman subjects in the framework defined by the articles of the Treaty of Küçük Kaynarca (1774).

From the early eighteenth century, Greeks were involved in the large-scale trade carried out by the European states, gathering and selling agricultural products to Westerners, as well as transporting imported manufactured goods from the harbors to the heartland of the empire. Greeks were implicated in a system of consular and mercantile relations as dragomen, commercial agents, and middlemen, and in these transactions they negotiated and exploited their Christian identity.¹⁹ They bought the protection of Western states, becoming *beratlis* (protégés), not in order to cease paying head tax to the Ottomans but because, primarily, as protégés of a foreign power they were insulated against the arbitrariness of Ottoman rule. Concurrently, they enjoyed all the mercantile privileges of the power that protected them within the Ottoman realm, along with the right to travel with their ships and to trade outside the empire's territorial waters.²⁰

As the empire became weaker, European rivals started to demand the protection of the rights and privileges of those of their religion and other non-Muslims. As protégés of the French, the Thessalonican tobacco merchant Constantinos Paikos and his son Panayotis escaped with their lives but not with their property, which was confiscated in 1714. This example demonstrates a clear differentiation in the status of Greek merchants in relation to previous centuries, if the case of Paikos is compared to that of Michail Kantakouzinis—the wealthiest tax farmer and merchant with a fortune that enabled him to build fifteen and more galleons each year for the Ottoman fleet—who was hanged in 1576. Moreover, the very numbers of protégés bear out what the protection

of a foreign power meant. By 1808 the Russians alone had enrolled 120,000 Greeks as “protected persons.”²¹ Greeks acquired the exclusive right to sail in the Black Sea and to trade with Orthodox Russia and the Danubian lands. They created a network of communities, strengthened by the common religion and the presence of Fanariots in Wallachia and Moldavia. The Greek diaspora radiated to all the key commercial centers of the Mediterranean and Central Europe, contributed to the cultural osmoses, and influenced the formation of national collective identities. But if the Greeks benefited greatly in the sectors of trade and shipping, they benefited equally—as did the Jews and the Armenians—from the empire’s severe fiscal crisis and its urgent need of cash and credit.²²

I shall not comment here on the conditions that allowed the economic promotion of the Rum millet. Even so, we must note the role that religious otherness played in the process of its economic evolution. As is well known, a Muslim never became a *beratli*. I also want to show that it was the economic development of the “infidels” in the second half of the eighteenth century that changed the dynamic of religious otherness between conqueror and conquered, creating a new mesh of relations between the two basic social groups. The same happened within the Rum millet, the Orthodox world, but that is outside the scope of the present paper. So, remaining with the problem of religious otherness between conqueror and conquered, the Orthodox Greek subject, for very specific reasons that are linked directly to his religious otherness and are dependent on it, succeeded in accumulating wealth as transporter, *beratli*, merchant, ship owner, creditor, and banker and in improving and consolidating his social and political presence close to the Ottoman authority.²³ The dynamic that developed from his activity in these aforementioned sectors is considered by earlier historiography as one of the basic causal factors of the Greek War of Independence.²⁴ Although recent research has cast doubts on the linear and continuous economic rise of the Greeks and has shown that the Greek Revolution of 1821 broke out in a period of economic crisis, when the emergency conditions that had previously favored Greek shipping and trade no longer existed, the fact remains that the revolutions in southeast Europe, including the Greek one, chronologically followed periods of development. It is worth stressing that it is no accident that religious otherness was fixed as an argument for justifying the uprising, despite the ecumenical throne’s established tactic of recommending to its flock submission to and abidance by the law of the sultan.²⁵

If religious otherness—that is, the category that sums up the cultural and social otherness between Ottoman subjects as formed in the late eighteenth century—was not universally a one-way street to overthrowing the power system, it certainly contributed to the nineteenth-century reforms known to history as Tanzimat (1839–76). The threat of a possible inclusion of the Ottoman Empire in the Russian sphere of influence prompted the great powers, especially Britain, to request the equality of Muslim and non-Muslim subjects.²⁶ The reasons they encouraged modernizing reforms and pressured for liberalization of the political system were the protection of their economic and political interests in the area and the conservation of the Ottoman state. However, even the decree of 1839, known as Hatt-i Sherif of Gülhane, failed to overturn the traditional differentiation of conquerors and conquered, since the categories it adopted for Ottoman society were none other than the original religious and ethnic ones. The phrase used by the sultan is characteristic: “Recipients of my benefactions are without exception the people of Islam and the other peoples [millet] who are subjects of my imperial sultanate.” It is also indicative that in the French translation of the text, which was distributed by the Sublime Porte, there was no separate mention of the Muslims. The reforms had to project equality, following the example of the French Revolution.²⁷

Essentially, through the process of westernizing the empire, it becomes patently clear that the sole element that legitimized the osmanlilik of the non-Muslims was their inclusion in a millet.²⁸ By recognizing equal political rights for Muslim and non-Muslim subjects of the empire, the Reform Decree of 1856 (Islahat Fermani) aimed through Ottoman citizenship to break through the religious and ethnic bonds of the millet and to confine its autonomy to cultural and religious issues. Nevertheless, through secularization and isonomy, it contributed to redefining the term “millet.” The millet became a minority group, while the Muslim subjects identified with the Islamic state and those controlling its machinery demanded, as a majority, a special status and position in society.²⁹ The reforms impelled the Turks toward self-determination, primarily toward a Turkish, not an Ottoman or a Muslim, identity. In this respect Tanzimat can be considered as the prelude to Turkish nationalism.³⁰ Thus, whereas the reforms mark an important watershed in the history of the Ottoman Empire, they did not lead to

a secular state, divested of the basic distinction of its subjects into Muslims and non-Muslims, a distinction that was principally religious, with whatever implications were implied at a political level. The egalitarian reforms could not produce real social integration.³¹ They did not lead to the creation of a state organization with a different structure and other relations between the subjects of the empire. So, inevitably, religious otherness was to be in 1923 the criterion for the Compulsory Population Exchange under the terms of the Treaty of Lausanne. In the Lausanne Protocol of 1923, the individuals to be transferred are identified according to two categories: adherents of a religion and subjects of a state.

The problematical secularization that was attempted either by Tanzimat or by Mustafa Kemal (Atatürk) had (and has) as a consequence the fragile formation of a nation state, since it will of necessity clash with religion. And the case of Lebanon, to end as I began, shows how difficult it is for religious otherness to be subordinated to the secularized state.

Notes

1. Skopetea 1992.
2. Kafadar 1995, esp. "Identity and Influence in the History of Nations."
3. Inalcik 1994, pp. 9–380.
4. The phrase is borrowed from the title of the study "The Strange History of the Millet System" in Braude 2000. The concept of the millet as membership of a religious and denominational group, and its function as an institution, is a reality only of the last centuries of the Ottoman Empire.
5. Braude–Lewis 1999.
6. Berktaç 1992.
7. Inalcik 1969, p. 97. "The proper order of the world is predicated upon all knowing their place and function and remaining in it, exhibiting no further ambition or aspiration for social mobility. In fact, more than minimal social mobility is not tolerated. Such is the picture that emerges from Koçu Bey's account of the ideal functioning of the Ottoman political class"; see Abou-El-Haj 1991, pp. 32–33.
8. Lewis 1999, p. 19.
9. See Salamone 1981; Brown 1996; and Todorova 1997.
10. Keyder 2005, pp. 3–17.
11. Adiyeké–Balta 2001, pp. 323–59.
12. Lowry 1998.
13. In the introduction to his *History*, Asdrachas (2003, pp. 22–32) refers precisely to this distinction of Muslim and non-Muslim *reaya* in the Ottoman taxation system.
14. See Eleni Gara's introduction to the Greek edition of Greene 2000. The wording of the sentence I have quoted from Gara's introduction allows multiple objections as to whether or not there was discrimination at an institutional or symbolic level between conquerors and conquered. And to cite another example; the *zimmi*, as is well known, were obliged to distinguished themselves sartorially from the Muslims (see Murphey 2002, pp. 135–70). I take this opportunity of noting that the title Shared World in the original, translated into Greek as *koinos kosmos*, does not express the concept of sharing, because according to the dictionaries, *shared* means portion detached and allotted to an individual from a common amount, whereas *koinos* (*common*) is that which belongs to many together, which is possessed identically by many or which is used by many.
15. Haldon 1993, p. 159.
16. "Certain groups, of course, had easier access to the top than others; nevertheless, all the different groups, on some level or another, did have links to the hierarchy of the political system, whether through intermediaries at the court or as an economically powerful class, such as the Greek Phanariots"; see Rodrigue 1995.
17. Haldon 1993, p. 130.
18. Abou-El-Haj 1991, pp. 11–18.
19. Stojanovich, 1992, pp. 1–77.
20. Bagis 1983.
21. Inalcik 1971, pp. 1179–89.
22. Wallerstein–Kasaba 1983, pp. 335–54.
23. Ch. Issawi (1982, p. 270) interprets as follows the prospering of the *zimmi* in the Ottoman Empire: "First, a minority that is excluded from certain avenues of power, like the army, church and politics tends to concentrate on and excel in business and the professions. . . Secondly minorities are clannish. They help, hire, promote, and do business with each other to the great annoyance of the surrounding majority." With reference to the 19th century, he completes these general principles of enrichment with five further factors: participation in expanding sectors; foreign protection; a favourable situation following various reforms in the Ottoman Empire; superior education; and help from coreligionists outside the region.
24. According to the views of one part of Greek national historiography, the merchants financed the struggle, while in the Marxist view it was mainly the emergent Greek bourgeoisie that posed the issue of the creation of an independent national state; see Hering 1996, pp. 105–20. The view has been established in the international bibliography that the intra-nationalist rivalries and the displeasure with the old élite fuelled the nationalism of the ambitious emergent élite. The well organized primates were loyal Ottomanists, while an antagonistic group, perhaps more that of the merchants, chose the banner of nationalism, to a point, as an ideological arsenal against the traditional elites; see Keyder 2005.
25. Gregory V, who was called to the ecumenical throne toward the end of 1798, immediately on assuming the office of patriarch recommended to the faithful, as was established,

submission to the sultan and obedience to his laws. On March 24, 1799, he issued a special encyclical in which, with biblical phrases, he teaches that the Christians' duty is submission to kings and to rulers, that any resistance is an unforgivable sin, and recommends specifically vigilance and protection from the "cunning deceivers", who foment the naïve to insurrection and put revolutionary declarations in circulation. The Greeks of the period, particularly those living abroad, men of letters coming from European centres, merchants, seamen, and so on, were reading many books "displeasing" the Church, both in Greek and in other languages, which circulated freely in Ottoman lands; see Vranousis 1997, pp. 125–329. In general on the ideological stance of the Church during the years of the Ottoman conquest, see Argyriou 1982.

26. Russian claims to the right to protect all Greek Orthodox subjects of the sultan (Article 7 of the Treaty of Küçük Kaynarca) had in the Ottoman view been the direct cause of the Crimean War in 1854. But before the Paris Peace Conference in 1856, the end of the Crimean War, under strong prodding from the ambassadors of Britain, France and Austria, the Ottoman statesmen worked out a reform edict, the *slahat Ferman*, which laid down the rights of all Ottoman subjects, and in particular of non-Muslims. The sultan promulgated this degree before the Paris Conference met. Thus Russia, at least, was to be confronted with a *fait accompli*; see Davison 1978, pp. 580–86.
27. Davinson 1973, p. 40; and Zürcher 2004.
28. Davinson 1977, pp. 25–56. See also Anagnostopoulou 1997.

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